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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
it may offer no clear-cut solutions, it does grapple for the first time
with the fundamental issues. Most significantly, it at least defines
methods for approaching an area which intellectually and practically
defies any concrete delineation.
LESLIE CROCKER
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - RACIAL IMBALANCE -
ALLEVIATION BY VOLUNTARY STATE ACTION
Strippoli v. Bickal, 21 App. Div. 2d 365,
250 N.Y.S.2d 969 (1964).
In Strippoli v. Bickal,' the appellate division of the New York
Supreme Court considered the validity of a transfer of one hundred
and eighteen non-white pupils to an all white school located in a
non-contiguous school zone. The School District Association of the
school to which the pupils were transferred contended that the trans-
fer was made only to cure an existing racial imbalance in the two
schools, and that this action was in contravention of the New York
Education Law' and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The respondent school board claimed that its purpose
in transferring the students was only to alleviate overcrowding. The
New York Supreme Court found the allegation of overcrowding
unreasonable. The court found that the board's true purpose was the
correction of racial imbalance and therefore held the transfers void.'
The appellate division reversed, holding that the board of educa-
tion's decision to transfer students does not become unlawful merely
because the factor of racial balance is accorded relevance.4
The Strippoli decision represents ruling case law in New York.
The rationale of the decision was first pronounced in Balaban v.
Rubin,5 in which the court of appeals upheld positive school board
action to reduce de facto segregation. In Balaban, existing racial
imbalance was cured by constituting the Brownsville School one-
1. 21 App. Div. 2d 365, 250 N.Y.S.2d 969 (1964).
2. N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 3201 reads as follows: "No person shall be refused admission
into or be excluded from any public school in the state of New York on account of
race, creed, color or national origin."
3. Strippoli v. Bickal, 42 Misc. 2d 475, 248 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd, 21 App.
Div. 2d 365, 250 N.Y.S.2d 969 (1964).
4. Strippoli v. Bickal, 21 App. Div. 2d 365, 250 N.Y.S.2d 969 (1964).




third Negro, one-third Puerto Rican, and one-third non-Puerto Rican
white. The question in both Strippoli and Balaban was therefore
the same: May a school board take affirmative action to alleviate
racial imbalance? The courts in both instances answered in the
affirmative, basing their decisions on section 3201 of the New York
Education Law6 which reiterates the mandate of Brown v. Board of
Educ.' The rationale seems to be that if the acts of a school board
exclude no one on the basis of race, its actions are permissible.
Neither of the courts in the above cases carried the constitutional
justification for its decision beyond the ruling in Brown,' for both
were apparently convinced that since the issue was not one of com-
pulsory integration, there could be no constitutional violation.
Hence, both decisions imply that voluntary state action, which is
explicitly racial and taken to reduce de facto segregation, engen-
ders no violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
Recent decisions in three federal circuit courts, however, sug-
gest that the implicit conclusion of the New York courts is not
valid. In the leading case of Boson v. Rippy, the Fifth Circuit
struck down a plan requiring the operation of mixed schools if the
parents of both races so desired. The court emphatically stated
that Negroes have no right to attend schools with whites; that their
only right is to be treated as individuals without regard to race.
In a supplemental opinion to Boson,'0 the Fifth Circuit was even
more explicit on this point. At issue in that instance was a plan
giving pupils the privilege of transferring from schools in which
they were in a racial minority. The court declared "that classifica-
6. N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 3201.
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. In Balaban v. Rubin the court said:
There can be no doubt . . . that de jure segregation is unconstitutional.
The question, however, as to whether there is an affirmative constitutional
obligation to take action to reduce de facto segregation is simply not in this
case. The issue, we repeat, is: May (not must) the schools correct the racial
imbalance? The simple fact as to the plan adopted and here under attack
is that it excludes no one from any school and has no tendency to foster or
produce racial segregation. Therefore, we hold, section 3201 of the Education
Law is in no way violated by this plan, .nor was there any other legal im-
pediment to its adoption. Balaban v. Rubin, 14 N.Y.2d 193, 199, 199 N.E.2d
375, 377, 250 N.Y.S.2d 281, 284 (1964).
In Strippoli v. Bickal the court said: "The only question before us is whether ...
the schools may also attempt to correct racial imbalance and this issue has already been
resolved by our highest court. ... " Strippoli v. Bickal, 21 App. Div. 2d 365, 368,
250 N.Y.S.2d 969, 972 (1964).
9. 285 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1960).
10. Id. at 47.
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tion according to race for purposes of transfer is hardly less uncon-
stitutional than such classification for purposes of original assign-
ment to a public school."" Thus, the two Boson decisions cast a
shadow upon the New York procedures.
The Fourth Circuit has reached a similar result. In Green v.
School Bd.,' the original assignment of pupils to segregated schools
with discriminatory provisions for transfer was held unconstitu-
tional. Finding the plan infected with racial considerations, the
court said: "As we have more than once made clear, school assign-
ments, to be constitutional, must not be based in whole or in part
on considerations of race."'"
Decisions in the Sixth Circuit, now reversed," provided some
basis for sustaining the action taken in New York. In Kelley v.
Board of Educ.,'5 the Sixth Circuit upheld a transfer privilege similar
to that condemned in the supplemental opinion in Boson v. Rippy.'"
The court's reasoning in Kelley is similar to that found in the New
York cases;' 7 namely, that "it is the denial of the right to attend a
nonsegregated school that violates the child's constitutional rights."' 8
Since the transfer privilege was voluntary and excluded no one, it
"does not deprive any of the children of equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment."'" But Goss v. Board of Educ.,2" a unani-
mous United States Supreme Court decision, crushed the logic of
the Sixth Circuit. Overruling that circuit's decisions on the transfer
privilege, the Court seemed to adopt the position taken in Boson v.
11. Id. at 48. For other Fifth Circuit decisions supporting the same proposition see,
e.g., Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1964);
Armstrong v. Board of Educ., 333 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1964); cf. Collins v. Walker, 329
F.2d 100 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 901 (1964).
12. 304 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1962).
13. Id. at 122. For other Fourth Circuit decisions supporting the same proposition
see, e.g., Wheeler v. Durham City Bd. of Educ., 309 F.2d 630 (4th Cit. 1962); Dod-
son v. School Bd., 289 F.2d 439 (4th Cit. 1961); Hill v. School Bd., 282 F.2d 473
(4th Cit. 1960).
14. Mapp v. Board of Educ., 319 F.2d 571 (6th Cir.), enforcing Goss v. Board of
Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
15. 270 F.2d 209 (6th Cit. 1959). Other Sixth Circuit decisions sustaining Kelley
are Goss v. Board of Educ., 301 F.2d 164 (6th Cit. 1962), rev'd, 373 U.S. 683 (1963);
Maxwell v. County Bd. of Educ., 301 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1962), rev'd, 373 U.S. 683
(1963).
16. 285 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1960).
17. N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 3201.
18. Kelley v. Board of Educ., 270 F.2d 209, 229 (6th Cit. 1959).
19. Id. at 230.
20. 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
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Rippy.21 The Court boldly stated that "classifications based on
race for purposes of transfers between public schools, as here, vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."2
On this basis it would seem that the New York scheme, which is
essentially a classification based on race for purposes of transfers
between public schools, is proscribed. But the Goss decision is a
limited one. The Court noted that there the transfer privilege was
a "one way operation"23 and as such promoted segregation; thus,
"no official transfer plan or provisions of which racial segregation
is the inevitable consequence may stand under the Fourteenth
Amendment."2 4 But, since the "inevitable consequence" of the New
York plan is hardly racial segregation, it is unlikely that it would
be found invalid if ever brought to a test in the Supreme Court.
Nonetheless, the sweeping language of many of the recent
federal decisions purports to make racial classifications for any pur-
pose invalid per se. If this be true, the New York integration plan
is unconstitutional on its face. However, it has been suggested
that the equal protection clause is not so restrictive.25 It does not pro-
scribe state action to distinguish, select, and classify the objects of
legislation so long as there is a reasonable basis for the legislative
action, and so long as the classification bears some reasonable re-
lation to the object of the legislation.2 ' Traditionally, racial classi-
fications have failed to meet this test, the only basis for the state
action having been prejudice.2 Divorcing itself from prejudice,
21. 285 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1960).
22. Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683, 687 (1963).
23. Id. at 688.
24. Id. at 689.
25. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). In McLaughlin the Supreme
Court ruled that a frnication" statute that punishes interracial violators was unconstitu-
tional. Mr. Justice White, writing for the majority, did not condemn the law because
a racial classification was used but because the classification was arbitary and unreason-
able. Thus, the implication is that racial classifications, if reasonable, are permissible.
26. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316
U.S. 535 (1942); New York Rapid Transit Corp. v. City of New York, 303 U.S. 573
(1938); Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936);
Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422 (1936); Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S.
404 (1935); Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580 (1935); Smith v.
Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931); Frost v. Corporate Common, 278 U.S. 515 (1929);
Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924); Kansas City So. Ry. v. Road Improvement
Dist. No. 6, 256 U.S. 658 (1921); F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412
(1920); Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Say., 170 U.S. 283 (1898).
27. E.g., Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963) (racial classification for
playground regulation); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963) (segre-
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